I spent a few hours yesterday figuring out this problem.
Given a simple glade3 (gtk.Builder) window, setting the on_window1_destroy signal to gtk.quit didn't seem to work. The window itself would disappear, but the process would continue to run in the background.
After fiddling with it, I finally identified the problem. It turns out that you have to set on_window1_destroy in the .glade file as well. The tutorials were unclear, but I guess that kind of makes sense. I had assumed that the "on_OBJECT_command" format was being parsed so as to hook directly to the OBJECT. That is, it knew which object to attach the signal to by parsing the signal name. But, instead, you need to set the signal in the glade file so that it is attached to the GtkWindow.
Seems like it will be a pain to set the signals for every object in the glade file. Hopefully there is an easier way and I'm just missing it.
Wednesday, April 28, 2010
Thursday, March 18, 2010
Fodor and Kitcher
The Boston Review of Books pretty much highlights how I see the debate between Fodor and Kitcher.
Fodor:
Fodor:
Darwin needs an account of selection-for that distinguishes phenotypic traits that cause fitness from traits that are merely correlated with traits that cause fitness.
Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini are imposing a requirement on natural selection that no biologist or philosopher whom we know of has ever suggested.
Monday, February 22, 2010
apprehension, association, affinity
Part of Kant's transcendental deduction (A119-23) takes us from the empiricist starting point to the position of transcendental idealism. Kant argues from the fact of perceptions as semantic grounds to the necessity of our unifying contribution to those perceptions.
Three steps:
I could not apprehend perceptions, if there were not contiguity between them. Otherwise perceptions would be encountered dispersed and isolated in my mind.
I could not associate perceptions, if there were not a subjective ground for recalling them. Otherwise I would not be able to bring perceptions to an image, or else representations would reproduce each other without distinction.
I could not determine those perceptions as a thing unless they are also associable; I could only be conscious of those perceptions as determinable if they belong to one consciousness. But one consciousness is only possible through the unity of apperception. Therefore, there must be an affinity to perceptions, which provides an objective ground of association.
By showing that there is an object affinity of perceptions, grounded on the unity of apperception, Kant has shown that, while perceptions are still our epistemic starting point, we could make no progress in our cognition unless we contributed objective rules of unity to all of our conscious sensory experience.
In the background, Kant is also setting up a modal question about perception. Perceptions are the ground for any cognitive claim to actuality. A concept is more than merely possible when its object is grounded in perception. The givenness of perception provides independent epistemic grounds to say that the concept is meaningful.
But Hume presented a dilemma about perceptions. All of our cognition is grounded in perception. If I have perceived all of the shades of blue except one, can the concept of that missing perception be considered cognition? Can we talk about possible perceptions in a meaningful way?
The above argument suggests that we can. Perceptions, as conscious appearances, are also subject to the transcendental unity of apperception, and thus, the pure functions of understanding. There are no simple perceptions, thus perceptions can be taken apart and recombined according to the rules laid out by the principles of pure understanding. We can thus ground possible perceptions through the same transcendental principles that would ground the real possibility of an empirical object.
Three steps:
I could not apprehend perceptions, if there were not contiguity between them. Otherwise perceptions would be encountered dispersed and isolated in my mind.
I could not associate perceptions, if there were not a subjective ground for recalling them. Otherwise I would not be able to bring perceptions to an image, or else representations would reproduce each other without distinction.
I could not determine those perceptions as a thing unless they are also associable; I could only be conscious of those perceptions as determinable if they belong to one consciousness. But one consciousness is only possible through the unity of apperception. Therefore, there must be an affinity to perceptions, which provides an objective ground of association.
By showing that there is an object affinity of perceptions, grounded on the unity of apperception, Kant has shown that, while perceptions are still our epistemic starting point, we could make no progress in our cognition unless we contributed objective rules of unity to all of our conscious sensory experience.
In the background, Kant is also setting up a modal question about perception. Perceptions are the ground for any cognitive claim to actuality. A concept is more than merely possible when its object is grounded in perception. The givenness of perception provides independent epistemic grounds to say that the concept is meaningful.
But Hume presented a dilemma about perceptions. All of our cognition is grounded in perception. If I have perceived all of the shades of blue except one, can the concept of that missing perception be considered cognition? Can we talk about possible perceptions in a meaningful way?
The above argument suggests that we can. Perceptions, as conscious appearances, are also subject to the transcendental unity of apperception, and thus, the pure functions of understanding. There are no simple perceptions, thus perceptions can be taken apart and recombined according to the rules laid out by the principles of pure understanding. We can thus ground possible perceptions through the same transcendental principles that would ground the real possibility of an empirical object.
Wednesday, February 17, 2010
Creative Slack
Jeffrey gets into the psychology of the banal political commentary in this year's parades.
I never expect much from Krewe D'Etat. And that allows me to be pleasantly surprised. I thought Muses was a bit humdrum this year as well. Although I ended the night in an overall bad mood, after seeing my beloved Dervish turned into a lesbian version of The Corner Pocket.
The very act of joining a club is, after all, a calculated attempt to improve or cement one's status and fortune through contrived interaction with a group of similarly desperate social climbers
I never expect much from Krewe D'Etat. And that allows me to be pleasantly surprised. I thought Muses was a bit humdrum this year as well. Although I ended the night in an overall bad mood, after seeing my beloved Dervish turned into a lesbian version of The Corner Pocket.
Wednesday, February 10, 2010
Political Speech and the First Amendment
Last night, as I stumbled home from the frigid Saint's parade, I thought about the problematic manner in which Progressive frame the recent Citizen's United decision. I keep coming across arguments against the personhood of corporations - and they drive me insane. First, it completely misunderstands the issue. The question is whether we can use our property as speech. And that seems undeniable. But it has nothing to do with treating corporations like persons. Second, misunderstanding the problem makes progressives look untrustworthy. No one thinks corporations are persons. And when the public realizes that this is not what is going on, they'll see progressives as sophists, constructing arguments out of the air.
So it is imperative that progressives understand the problem with the proper framework. That way we can provide proper, clear responses to civil libertarians without talking past each other. After all, civil libertarians and progressives usually agree. And I don't hold progressives as the only ones to blame. Although progressive haven't framed their issue well, it appears that civil libertarians are often relying on a superficial understanding of the First Amendment.
Precedence is usually ignored by the civil libertarian, since they often take the First Amendment to be straightforward. The problem is that it is not straight forward. Even if we grant you a right to use your property for political speech, the question of what constitutes your property is not obvious. The example I thought of last night was religion. Citizens might incorporate (or not) their religious institution; the religious institution is the property of the congregation. Yet we have clear laws that restrict the presence of political speech in religious worship. While they can take a stand on social issues, they cannot endorse candidates. Otherwise, and this is the key point, they risk their religious tax exemption.
While the church is the property of its congregation, it also holds a special contractual relationship with the government. The government, then, has a stake in the church. Not such that it owns the church, but insofar as it grants them special rights - rights which allow the churches to flourish where they might otherwise fall under the weight of business taxes. Churches don't have to operate like a business because the congregation doesn't share the full burdens of ownership. Similarly for corporations.
Progressive needs to be following the arguments and examples set out by constitutional lawyers such as Lawrence Lessig. For example, in this article Lessig draws together a number of important points by looking at cases in supreme court precedence. His argument takes the form I'd been thinking through, looking at similar cases were we allow the government to restrict speech acts, and then comparing those cases with corporate speech.
First, look at an institution where we have allowed the government to restrict speech acts:
Then compare it to the corporation:
So it seems that the progressive argument against Citizen's United is getting strong. Greenwald, my favorite civil libertarian, notes Lessig's argument and will hopefully write a response soon.
To me, Lessig's argument seems strong. While it is filled out with legal facts, the argument itself is one that I, a layperson, could arrive at on my own. It gets to the heart of the matter without being rhetorically complex. And, most importantly, it doesn't rely on the false argument about the personhood of corporations.
Shorter Lessig:
The government gives fiscal rights to corporations, so it has a stake in their political speech.
So it is imperative that progressives understand the problem with the proper framework. That way we can provide proper, clear responses to civil libertarians without talking past each other. After all, civil libertarians and progressives usually agree. And I don't hold progressives as the only ones to blame. Although progressive haven't framed their issue well, it appears that civil libertarians are often relying on a superficial understanding of the First Amendment.
Precedence is usually ignored by the civil libertarian, since they often take the First Amendment to be straightforward. The problem is that it is not straight forward. Even if we grant you a right to use your property for political speech, the question of what constitutes your property is not obvious. The example I thought of last night was religion. Citizens might incorporate (or not) their religious institution; the religious institution is the property of the congregation. Yet we have clear laws that restrict the presence of political speech in religious worship. While they can take a stand on social issues, they cannot endorse candidates. Otherwise, and this is the key point, they risk their religious tax exemption.
While the church is the property of its congregation, it also holds a special contractual relationship with the government. The government, then, has a stake in the church. Not such that it owns the church, but insofar as it grants them special rights - rights which allow the churches to flourish where they might otherwise fall under the weight of business taxes. Churches don't have to operate like a business because the congregation doesn't share the full burdens of ownership. Similarly for corporations.
Progressive needs to be following the arguments and examples set out by constitutional lawyers such as Lawrence Lessig. For example, in this article Lessig draws together a number of important points by looking at cases in supreme court precedence. His argument takes the form I'd been thinking through, looking at similar cases were we allow the government to restrict speech acts, and then comparing those cases with corporate speech.
First, look at an institution where we have allowed the government to restrict speech acts:
Yet in 1991, in an opinion by Chief Justice Robert's former boss, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in the case of Rust v. Sullivan, the Court found no First Amendment problem at all with the government's restriction on doctors' speech. Indeed, it wasn't even a difficult case according to the Court ("no question but that the statutory prohibition contained in § 1008 is constitutional.")
Why? How? Well the doctors at issue worked in family planning clinics that had received at least some of their funds from the government. And in exchange for that benefit, the government was free to gag the doctors however it wished.
Then compare it to the corporation:
But of course, corporations do receive a gift from the government. The government limits the legal liability of investors in that corporation in exchange for their risking their capital to spur innovation and growth. That benefit is significant.
So it seems that the progressive argument against Citizen's United is getting strong. Greenwald, my favorite civil libertarian, notes Lessig's argument and will hopefully write a response soon.
To me, Lessig's argument seems strong. While it is filled out with legal facts, the argument itself is one that I, a layperson, could arrive at on my own. It gets to the heart of the matter without being rhetorically complex. And, most importantly, it doesn't rely on the false argument about the personhood of corporations.
Shorter Lessig:
The government gives fiscal rights to corporations, so it has a stake in their political speech.
Wednesday, January 27, 2010
Hell froze over
I had no idea I was in agreement with Jay Batt.
First I had my heart broken. Now this. What the fuck did I do wrong this morning? Answer: get out of bed.
"I'm not so thrilled about taking people's land and letting LSU just do what they want," Batt said. "I'm more in favor of rebuilding Charity Hospital ... and not tearing down or deconstructing city properties."
First I had my heart broken. Now this. What the fuck did I do wrong this morning? Answer: get out of bed.
Thursday, January 21, 2010
Monday, January 04, 2010
Safety is not an American value
Greenwald puts it precisely.
The Constitution is grounded in the premise that there are other values and priorities more important than mere Safety. Even though they knew that doing so would help murderers and other dangerous and vile criminals evade capture, the Framers banned the Government from searching homes without probable cause, prohibited compelled self-incrimination, double jeopardy and convictions based on hearsay, and outlawed cruel and unusual punishment. That's because certain values -- privacy, due process, limiting the potential for abuse of government power -- were more important than mere survival and safety.
Friday, December 04, 2009
Eagle!
<a href="http://librarychronicles.blogspot.com/2009_12_01_archive.html#1901682302846581343">Jeffery</a> might not appreciate the Eagle Scout reference, but I thinks it's quite an accomplishment. Where I grew up, the challenge was to make Eagle Scout before they find out you're gay and boot ya. Harder than it sounds.
so it begins
Signs have already begun popping up on St. Charles, letting us know who the old money is voting for.
Saturday, November 28, 2009
heads up
A number of bloggers whom I respect are planning to endorse Stacey Head. I don't get it. Her politics are shit. She's on the wealthy side of a corrupt system, so she can stand as an emblem of reform. And fighting corruption shouldn't involve supererogatory acts. It should be a basic standard. What matters is her disregard for the poor and working people of the city; her interest in the killing the public school system, public housing, public transportation, and public services in general. She's a politician, her politics are important.
Saturday, October 03, 2009
Monday, August 03, 2009
Friday, July 17, 2009
Thursday, July 09, 2009
I'd have done it myself for $40,000
What a waste:
City begins $496,000 in Bourbon Street sidewalk repairs
or maybe they're getting these in ivory?
City begins $496,000 in Bourbon Street sidewalk repairs
or maybe they're getting these in ivory?
Wednesday, May 27, 2009
Nowhere in Iberville
Reckdahl puts a contradiction before us - and not just two competing opinions, but one opinion and a statement of fact - and cannot manage to draw it out, let alone inquire after it.
Isn't the one-woman board responsible for the long-neglected complex?
On Wednesday morning, before the mayor's speech, HANO's one-woman board, Diane Johnson, announced she had walked the long-neglected complex the previous day and did not like what she found.
Isn't the one-woman board responsible for the long-neglected complex?
Sunday, May 24, 2009
preying on the slovenliness of our representatives
Jindal is, of course, accepting the federal stimulus money, despite all the hoopla about it. But to qualify for the unemployment compensation portion (98 million), the state would need to alter its laws and expend the eligibility requirement for unemployment compensation. Jindal and LA Republicans oppose the move, while many state Dems support it. So state Rep Honey (D Baton Rouge) turns to some 'rookie-doo' and catches the Republican lead house off guard.
Rep Honey slides the amendment into a non-controversial bill, offers the House time (though, little time) to read it, and then non-nonchalantly waves any further discussion of the amendment. Unsuspecting, the house passes the bill unanimously. Caught by their own laziness, they are, of course, raising a stink. This reminds me of that documentary I watched on the texas house, where most reps didn't even bother showing up for votes. They'd just have their friends vote for them.
And I would ask the T-P why a 3 1/2 hour meeting is supposed to be fatiguing?
Rep Honey slides the amendment into a non-controversial bill, offers the House time (though, little time) to read it, and then non-nonchalantly waves any further discussion of the amendment. Unsuspecting, the house passes the bill unanimously. Caught by their own laziness, they are, of course, raising a stink. This reminds me of that documentary I watched on the texas house, where most reps didn't even bother showing up for votes. They'd just have their friends vote for them.
And I would ask the T-P why a 3 1/2 hour meeting is supposed to be fatiguing?
Wednesday, April 29, 2009
font sizes
This has been an academic year from hell, and I have one party to blame: Microsoft. What did you do to Microsoft Word? Why (Oh, why!) did you shrink the average page size? (1 and 1/4 inches? Why not just 1 inch? What the hell??) But most importantly, why did you change the default font? (Times new roman was simple and easy to read. This Cambria crap is too big, too bubbly, and looks horribly unprofessional. Why not just set the default to a crayon font?)
Microsoft, I hate you more.
Microsoft, I hate you more.
Monday, April 27, 2009
The Heideggarian Virus
Or: The only reason you would want an M.B.A., rather than a degree in philosophy. What a great article. Maybe my students will like it.
The Management Myth
The Management Myth
Most of management theory is inane, writes our correspondent, the founder of a consulting firm. If you want to succeed in business, don’t get an M.B.A. Study philosophy instead
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